1 Introduction

In January 2018, in the Ras al-Nabaa area in Beirut, Nada B. was killed by her divorced husband, Fadi A., after being shot nine times on the street (Massena 2018). Unfortunately, this is just one example of gender-based violence (GBV) caused by small arms and light weapons (SALW)Footnote 1 in Lebanon, which is often unreported, treated as a taboo, or misunderstood.

This paper investigates the correlation between the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW and GBVFootnote 2 in Lebanon. In doing so, it highlights the disconnect between legal regulation and the reality on the ground, and presents original empirical research documenting women’s experiences.

The upward trend in the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW in Lebanon strongly indicates that the legal provisions and instruments claiming to prevent and govern them are failing to achieve their stated goals. Interrelated, this suggests that Lebanon’s laws and procedures are also failing to prevent and regulate weapons-related GBV. While this might suggest a strong causal link, nonetheless, the gendered impact of the proliferation, possession and use of SALW, for the perpetuation of violence or threats of violence against women in Lebanon, cannot exclusively be understood in terms of the limitations of Lebanon’s domestic gun laws and international legally binding agreements. Rather, this is a systemic issue which is also rooted in discriminative legislation, namely the Domestic Violence Law and the Personal Status Law. Further, the latter, together with Lebanon’s gun laws, do not operate in a vacuum. In practice, the gendered impact of unregulated SALW is also upheld by socio-cultural norms of Lebanese society which both underpin and reinforce the patriarchy and Lebanon’s permissive ‘gun-culture’. The principal outcome of these combined factors is that women are prevented from speaking out about both the violence they face and their perpetrator’s illicit possession of SALW out of fear of potential and real repercussions; and even in cases where incidents of weapons-related GBV are reported to GBV associations or the relevant authorities, our research indicates a high level of impunity and practical, socio-cultural and economic obstacles facing women seeking to obtain protection. By extension, therefore, the laws and protective procedures claiming to regulate GBV and SALW are failing.

Another, less tangible outcome of the correlation between GBV and SALW in Lebanon is society’s monolithic approach to conceptualising weapons-related GBV, which is underpinned by a lack of awareness of, or perhaps an unwillingness to accept, the link between GBV and the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW. Instead, this matter is overwhelmingly (mis)understood through a narrow lens of being an issue of national security only, rather than an issue which is also tied up with systemic violence against women stemming in part from discriminatory political structures and laws, which are rooted in patriarchal norms. As such, we seek to redress this by employing a gender approach to our research, whereby women are at the forefront of the discussion. Needless to say, this is a wide-reaching problem which will require substantial efforts by policy makers, campaigners, and academics to disentangle in order to ultimately better understand, prevent, and respond to weapons-related GBV.

This paper presents original research elucidating the tension between, on the one hand, the regulations and laws claiming to prevent and control the proliferation and possession of SALW and GBV, and on the other hand, the reality on the ground in Lebanon, as well as the factors underpinning this disconnect. Section 2 details our research methods, before Section 3 introduces and analyses the domestic and international legal framework and laws claiming to regulate SALW and GBV in Lebanon. Section 4 makes the link between the legislative shortcomings examined in Section 3 and the socio-cultural norms and the patriarchy, which together compound weapons-related GBV. Section 5 provides an overview of the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW in Lebanon. Section 6 presents the survey results and analysis of the findings, and Section 7 concludes and provides policy recommendations. As far as we are aware, we are the first to investigate this subject matter in this way, and we provide novel perspectives and insights into the proliferation of SALW and GBV violence in Lebanon. This research therefore serves as a building block for future studies.

2 Methodology

To understand the problem of weapons-related GBV in Lebanon, and whether the attempts to address such are or are not effective, we conducted original research along three overlapping pathways. Throughout, we undertook literature reviews to inform and check the details of the project as a whole. This underpinned the synthesis of understanding about the legal context enabling GBV presented below, which both framed and was informed by our other research.

Alongside our literature reviews, our empirical work also included collecting first hand testimony and evidence of experiences and understanding of weapons-related GBV, and the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW, from a range of expert contributors. Primary data was obtained through a survey completed by 40 womenFootnote 3 living in five different governorates of Lebanon: Akkar, Beirut, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and North, who were either known to or supported by the interviewed associations. The survey’s questions were drawn from the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) narrative which regulates the international trade in conventional weapons and puts emphasis on the need to strengthen systems and infrastructure for the regulation and control of arms through investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings, and the domestic, micro-level dimension of the use of weapons. Lebanon ratified the ATT in 2019, the same year that the Lebanese National Action Plan (NAP) was introduced, which is why this framework was adopted in the survey.

In parallel to the survey, between December 2020 and January 2021, we conducted semi-structured interviews with key figures working for four Lebanese-based and long-established associations of the civil society sector. These were KAFA (Enough) Violence & Exploitation, the Lebanese Women Democratic Gathering (RDFL), the Lebanese Council to Resist Violence Against Women (LECORVAW), and Sharika Wa Laaken. The scope of their work ranged from advocating for the enactment of pro-women law reforms and policies challenging prevailing patriarchal practices, mentalities and concepts which exist in Lebanese society and politics; conducting research and training; monitoring gender-based violence trends and human rights abuses through a feminist lens; providing social, legal, and psychological support to victims of GBV; and raising awareness of and aiming to eliminate forms of violence and discrimination against women. We also interviewed Fadi Abi AllamFootnote 4, founder of the non-profit organisation the Permanent Peace Movement (PPM), which specialises in local-level conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and the eradication of SALW in Lebanon. Given the scarcity of pre-existing research on the subject, these interviews served to fill in the gaps of knowledge required for our analysis and the associations’ interpretations and application of the relevant statutory gun laws. All contributions were anonymous unless participants gave us explicit permission to name them.

Our research faced a number of practical limitations. For example, funding and timing issues constrained both the number of participants we could involve in the survey and the longevity of the project as a whole. Further, the global COVID-19 pandemic limited our ability to conduct the research in all governorates of Lebanon, as it impeded researchers’ movement and travel. Future work could usefully extend the study to these areas. In addition, some Lebanese GBV associations we approached opted against being interviewed, which we suspect was out of fear of speaking about or being associated with the politically and socially sensitive subjects of weapons and GBV in the Lebanese context.

3 The domestic and international legal frameworks which address SALW and GBV in Lebanon

The legal and normative framework is the basis for Lebanon’s current problem with the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW and weapons-related GBV.

3.1 SALW regulation

Two domestic instruments are particularly relevant to analysing the failure in SALW regulation in Lebanon. Lebanon’s Decree No. 137 of June 1959, amended by Law No. 22 of 29 March 1966, remains the central domestic gun control legislation in Lebanon and regulates the classification, production, sales, and possession of armaments and ammunition (Hakim 1976). Article 29 of the Decree stipulates that a licence to possess and carry weapons and ammunition of the fifth category, namely firearms that are not considered to be war materials, can be granted to Lebanese civilians who are 18 years old or over, mentally stable, and who have not been convicted of a criminal conviction (Hakim 1976). The possession of hunting weapons may also be licensed to Lebanese citizens who are at least 16 years old, provided they are under the responsibility of their parents. Article 72 of Chapter 6 provides penalties of between six months to two years imprisonment for people who carry a weapon without a permit. A second key legally binding instrument which governs Lebanon’s gun laws is the Lebanese Penal Code. This makes it illegal to possess unlicensed firearms or ammunition, a crime which can result in a sentence of imprisonment of up to six months and a fine, or to use a weapon unless for legitimate self-defence. As our survey results elucidate, however, both the Lebanese Decree No. 137 and the Penal Code have failed to regulate the ‘proper’ and legal use of SALW, the illicit trade in SALW, or the inheritance of unlicensed SALW.

International law which acknowledges links between the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW and GBV is also relevant to this research. Most prominentlyFootnote 5, the ATT explicitly recognises this link in Article 7(4) which commits its state parties to consider the risk of exported conventional arms “being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children”. The Treaty also provides a framework for state parties to monitor, conduct risk assessments, and report on GBV incidents which were related to the possession and use of unregulated conventional weapons (Fabre et al. 2021).

Despite being a State Party to the ATT, the Lebanese government failed to submit its initial and annual reports on the national transfer control system of weapons as mandated by the Treaty, indicating the Treaty’s limited success in governing and ensuring the recording of the illicit proliferation of SALW in Lebanon (ATT 2022). Nonetheless, the ATT did encourage the government to introduce the 2019 Lebanese NAP.Footnote 6 This in turn complemented and advanced Lebanon’s implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 which seeks, amongst other goals, to contain armed conflicts and consolidate more effective protection measures for women and girls against the use of violence and weapons (National Commission for Lebanese Women 2019). However, whilst the Lebanese NAP indicates that its implementation “requires close coordination between ministries and other national institutions, civil society, United Nations agencies and other international organisations”, in reality it fell short of meaningfully including civil society in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the NAP processes. This includes the exclusion of civil society from the NAP’s working groups and consultations, for example (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom [WILPF] 2023). Thus, whilst the introduction of the Lebanese NAP and ratification of the ATT are positive developments which signal the government’s commitment to tackling the gendered impact of SALW, the extent of their success and efficacy in bringing about meaningful change is contingent on the government complying with their associated goals and legal obligations.

Indeed, despite Lebanon’s domestic gun laws and ratification of international arms control treaties or UN resolutions,Footnote 7 the uncontrolled proliferation and possession of unlicensed and illicit SALW is extensive and increasing in Lebanon. According to Small Arms Survey, which used systematically integrated methods and combined multiple data sources in order to estimate the total rate of licensed and unlicensed firearms ownership in specific countries, Lebanon ranked ninth in the world for the highest rate of civilian firearms holdings at 31.9% in 2017 (Karp 2018, p. 4). This marks a substantial increase from the Small Arms Survey’s estimation in 2007 when the rate of the possession of firearms by Lebanese civilians was judged to be 21.0%Footnote 8 (Small Arms Survey 2007). In brief, therefore, there is a clear dissonance between, on the one hand, domestic and international instruments which seek to regulate the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW and, on the other hand, the reality on the ground. This is also supported by our survey results.

3.2 GBV regulation

Alongside arms regulation, Lebanon’s domestic laws embed gender biases which give disproportionate power to Lebanese men. Two legal instruments are particularly significant in driving the correlation between SALW and GBV. The first is the Personal Status Law, which discriminates against women in terms of their rights to divorce and custody of their children. It also perpetuates other inequalities in that civilians belonging to different religious communities are treated differently by the law. For example, Sunni and Shia laws permit men the absolute right to divorce, while women only enjoy a conditional right to divorce (Human Rights Watch 2015), and Shia, Sunni and Druze religious laws stipulate that in the event of a divorce, the child’s age, not their best interests, determines with whom they will live. The question of “guardianship” of a child, too, grants the fathers the overriding right to raise and care for their children both during and after marriage. Our interviews conducted with KAFA (2021), RDFL (2020) and LECORVAW (2021) indicated that the Personal Status Law has far-reaching implications in terms of influencing Lebanese women’s choices in seeking options to ensure their own protection from GBV. For example, even for women who are legally entitled to obtain a divorce in accordance with the Personal Status Law, their ‘concerns about having their children reside with them often make them unable or unwilling to pursue a divorce’ (Human Rights Watch 2015).

Secondly, the Law on Protection of Women and Family Members from Domestic Violence, referred to here as the Domestic Violence Law, came into force on 01 April 2014, prior to which no law in Lebanon penalised GBV. Civil society played an important role in advocating for its ratification and implementation. This law is divided into two sections. The punitive section provides for tougher penalties for certain crimes committed between family members as stipulated in the Lebanese Penal Code. It also criminalises beating and other forms of violent abuse. Meanwhile, the protective section legislates for enacting a protection orderFootnote 9 for victims.

The Domestic Violence Law is considered to be a progressive step towards preventing GBV (Human Rights Watch 2015). However, in practice, our empirical study echoes previous research on this issue in suggesting that this law is incomplete and that its implementation is disconnected with reality (Moussawi and Yassin 2017). This is principally for the following five reasons:

  1. 1.

    The law falls short of criminalising the act of marital sexual violence and abuse per se by instead only outlining the beating and threats of violence that a husband resorts to in order to obtain “marital rights”.

  2. 2.

    Law 293 on the Domestic Violence Law excludes providing protection to victims of violence from perpetrators who fall outside the legally recognised and traditional marital framework, such as ex-spouses, cohabitees, or parties to temporary marriages. This also includes security officials who are permitted to bring their weapons home. We note from our empirical research that in practice, women can remain threatened by such relationships.

  3. 3.

    The protection order provisions do not discuss the option of requiring the abuser to undertake rehabilitation support.

  4. 4.

    The protective section stipulated in the law is failing to ensure that women have adequate and attainable support or to provide the measures required to gain comprehensive and effective protection. For example, in order for a perpetrator of violence to be punished under the law, a legal case must be filed by the victim, without which legal proceedings will not take place. In practice, Lebanese women exposed to GBV often lack the economic means which are required to file a legal case against an abusive or violent perpetrator (Moussawi and Yassin 2017).

  5. 5.

    Our empirical research also emphasises a common flaw relating to the interpretation or application of the Domestic Violence Law, specifically concerning Law 293. In practice, it is commonly thought of and applied through a limited lens whereby only the violence practiced by the husband against his wife is considered. In fact, the law has a broader scope and recognises that domestic violence can be committed by other family members, such as violence perpetrated by the father against adult children—since minors are covered by Law No. 422—or vice versa, or violence perpetrated by brothers, adopted or foster children, or extended family members.

In short, the Personal Status Law actively discriminates against women by granting men legal protection and greater rights in divorce and in respect of the custody of children which are prominent factors contributing to women’s silence on or compliance with weapons-related GBV, in addition to serving as a deterrent to women reporting their perpetrator’s possession of unlicensed SALW. Secondly, the Domestic Violence Law falls short of guaranteeing women’s protection after they have either been abused or reported incidents of violence or threats of violence by presenting practical and economic obstacles to accessing protection. These domestic laws are reinforced by feeding into Lebanon’s socio-cultural norms, which therefore also play a prominent role in exacerbating the correlation between GBV and SALW.

4 Socio-cultural norms and patriarchy

Our research shows that Lebanon’s domestic legal framework discussed above reflects and reinforces Lebanese societal customs and traditions which compound gender inequality in Lebanon, including by perpetuating the gendered impact of SALW. Despite often being heralded as a progressive country in terms of its human rights and development track record, Lebanese patriarchal assumptions and practices compound patterns of oppression which acutely undermine gender equality and women’s empowerment (Avis 2017; USAID 2012; World Bank 2015). Indeed, the Gender Gap index ranked Lebanon third to last in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in 2016, with only Syria and Yemen falling behind it (World Economic Forum (WEF) 2016, p. 228). These socio-cultural norms and concepts underpin the dominant belief held by many segments of Lebanese society that weapons are the adornment of men. The psychological and physical impact this has for women is reinforced by the inequity of protection offered by the Personal Status Law. For example, as implied by our empirical data and secondary research, women are often deterred from both reporting incidents of violence or their perpetrator’s possession of an unlicensed weapon. This may be out of fear or facing threats of divorce or losing custody over her children, or the societal repercussions such as estrangement from her local community or having her reputation tarnished.

Women’s acquiescence to weapons-related violence could also be due to, or at least be reinforced by, the generational effect of having witnessed their mothers, sisters, or other family members being subjected to threats or violence, which normalises aggressive behaviour. The result is the reproduction of toxic masculinity and patriarchal beliefs which entrenches weapons-related violence. Understanding these socio-cultural norms informed our design and roll out of the survey discussed in Section 6.

5 Overview of the uncontrolled proliferation and possession of illicit SALW in Lebanon

There is an increasingly high volume of unlicensed SALW in the possession of civilians in Lebanon. This phenomenon, and the reasons for it, are multifaceted and complex. Our aforementioned interviewee, Abi Allam, divides the problem into two classifications: weapons which have been inherited, which pose particular dangers because they are old and poorly maintained; and weapons known as “Amiriya” which were originally owned and used by the Lebanese Army or the Internal Security Forces (ISF) during the 1975–1990 Lebanese civil war and which are distinguishable because of their unique markings. Whilst medium and heavy weapons were seized by governmental authorities after the civil war, SALW were not, and therefore they remained in circulation and the possession of civilians without regulation (Abi Allam 2021). According to Abi Allam, increasing numbers of men from low- and middle-income backgrounds are selling their weapons both inside the country and to smugglers at the borders, as the economic crisis in Lebanon puts increasing pressure on Lebanese households. It is inherently very difficult to track and trace this illicit trade (Abi Allam 2021; Human Rights Watch 2022).

Both inherited and “Amiriya” weapons remain untraced and outside of formal accounting practices, not least as their owners could be afraid of handing them over to the authorities as doing so could mean they face legal consequences. For instance, Article 24 of Chapter 4 of the Decree No. 137 states: “the permit for carrying and possessing weapons of the fifth category is personal; it is granted only once, and its validity does not expire until its holder is deceased or when he no longer meets the qualifying conditions as provided in the present legislative decree” (Hakim 1976). Nonetheless, according to Abi Allam, it remains an open question as to the extent to which this is being implemented: families of deceased arms owners may not understand, or be unwilling to accept, their obligations or how to fulfil them without retribution. It is unclear and in practice unlikely that the authorities have systems, personnel, or even sufficient inclination for enforcing them. These weapons thus remain part of Lebanon’s extensive and expanding black market and illicit trafficking of SALW in Lebanon itself and across its borders.

In addition to these legacy weapons that are inherited and circulated within Lebanon without regulation, individuals and groups acquire and retain weapons for political and security reasons, referred to as “weapons of resistance”.Footnote 10 For example, since 2019, with the onset of the Lebanese financial crisis, allegations of an enhanced illicit business in selling firearms and ammunition have been reported in Lebanon. This phenomenon is thought to be linked to the Lebanese state’s increasing failure in managing crime rates and political violence. Indeed, in addition to contributing to the uncontrolled possession of SALW, Lebanon’s civil war has had another long-lasting effect in creating a permissive culture and environment for the ownership or use of weapons (Karp 2007, p. 62), including for the ostensible purpose of personal protection against violence and crime which has been increasing in Lebanon. Such cumulative instability and pattern of events have thus further incentivised civilians to buy weapons on the black market out of fear and in the belief that they offer personal protection (Iskandarani 2021).

Moreover, the existence of armed groups operating on Lebanese soil and outside of any legal framework poses a major challenge to Lebanon in regulating arms transfers and combating the illicit trafficking and circulation of SALW. And since the eruption of the Syrian conflict, there has been firstly a heightened illicit arms smuggling trade between Lebanon and Syria (see for example Nichols 2012; Al Jazeera 2012; Iskandarani 2021), and secondly allegations of arms transfers to political actors within Lebanon by Syrian traffickers in response to the increased demand (United Nations Security Council 2018, p. 8).

Accordingly, we find that there are complex and at times interrelated reasons for the existence of illicit and unlicensed SALW in Lebanon which, as examined in Section 3, Lebanon’s inadequate gun laws are failing to regulate.

6 Findings and analysis

6.1 Overview of survey findings: how women experience gender-based and weapons-related violence in Lebanon

The survey asked respondents about the threat of use or actual use of weapons in instances of GBV they had experienced. Of the 40 respondents, 29, i.e., nearly three-quarters (72.5%), answered that their male abuser had threatened them with weapons-related violence. The survey’s results also indicate that the threat of weapons was accompanied by other types of violence: 62.5% of the surveyed women reported that this included physical violence, 25% reported that this included psychological or emotional violence, and 10% reported that the threats were accompanied by sexual violence. An overwhelming 82.5% of the respondents confirmed that they had been beaten with a weapon, whilst 12.5% had not. These figures describe sharply that there is a relationship between GBV and the use of weapons.

According to the survey, 77.5% of the surveyed women’s husband, father, brother, or extended family member owned an unlicensed weapon, whilst 15% owned a licensed weapon. The remainder opted against sharing this information. This result highlights the extent of just how flawed the system is in regulating the inheritance and acquisition of unlicensed SALW. Additionally, from the survey, 35% of the participants responded that the weapons their perpetrators owned were obtained from illegal trade, whereas 52.5% answered that they did not know where their perpetrator got their weapon from. A total of 12.5% did not want to share this information. The high number of women who answered that they did not know where their perpetrator obtained the weapons from can in part be understood by the Lebanese patriarchal society which upholds that women’s interference in men’s private affairs is impermissible. Further studies are required to better establish the origins of weapons and ammunition which are used in GBV incidents in order to address and help resolve this problem.

Our survey sample suggested that there may be correlations between certain characteristics of the participants and the likelihood that they had encountered GBV, although additional research would be needed to explore and verify these further. Nonetheless, the survey suggested a correlation between GBV and the length of time a woman has been living with or knows her perpetrator: 50% of the respondents had known their attacker for more than 5 years, 25% had known them between 1 and 5 years, and 12.5% for less than 1 year. But 72.5% also said that they had been threatened with a weapon previously. Considering that a minority of the surveyed women had either reported their experience of weapons-related GBV themselves (30%) or had such reported on their behalf (12.5%), as detailed below, these results indicate two key things: firstly, the high degree of normalisation of violence and the existence of weapons which impedes women or the wider society from taking meaningful action; and secondly women’s compliance with enduring violence out of fear of facing repercussions such as divorce or losing the custody of their children. Further research is needed therefore to ascertain, for example, the frequency and/or severity of the GBV and whether this influenced individual women’s decisions to report the violence and therefore be part of the survey group.

The survey also gave opportunities to explore who commits GBV. A substantial majority (75%) of survey respondents said that they had encountered violence from their husband, but other cited perpetrators included brothers (7.5%), fathers (5%), other family relatives (5%), and others including co-workers or security officials who can take their duty weapons to their homes and are thus empowered and, it might seem, feel a sense of heightened entitlement to use their weapons (7.5%). In other words, the results indicate that weapons-related violence perpetrated against women by men who are not their husbands does exist, which underlines the need for a better interpretation of the scope of the Domestic Violence Law, as discussed above.

Socio-economic factors were also explored in the survey. Nearly three-quarters (72.5%) of the respondents did not work, 12.5% were self-employed, and 10% occupied a permanent full-time job. Although the relevance of the employment status of GBV victims requires additional research in order to establish the extent of its influence over the likelihood of experiencing weapons-related GBV, it may be that employed women are more aware of their rights to protection under the laws or the reporting procedures compared to women who experience heightened societal and economic isolation. It is also important to consider whether the socio-economic status of Lebanese families influences the degree or likelihood of weapons-related violence (amongst other forms of violence), experienced by women. In our survey, the percentage of weapons-related violence perpetrated against the surveyed women who reported facing economic hardships reached 45%, compared to 50% for women who stated that they were from middle-class households. According to the survey, it appeared that there were few cases of violence (5%) against women who claimed that they were living in or from wealthy backgrounds. Although the survey does not claim to be representative of different socio-economic classes, nor of other horizontal inequalities including race and ethnicity, these results indicate that economic factors may well play a central role in influencing the likelihood of weapons-related GBV. The economic crisis in Lebanon, characterised for example by the devaluation of the Lebanese currency against the dollar, the rising rate of inflation in food and basic goods, and high unemployment, contributes to pressures on Lebanese households, in particular low-income and increasingly middle-income families, which can translate into forms of GBV. It is noted that in this particular survey, the participants self-reported their socio-economic background. We did not ask or look for independent indicators of this and we recommend that future studies do this in order to establish more accurate trends.

Some 60% of the surveyed women answered that they had known about the presence of a weapon in their household before being assaulted, whereas 37.5% were unaware. These results indicate two key things which highlight, above all else, the central role that the patriarchal culture plays in contributing to proliferating weapons-related GBV. Firstly, even though most of the surveyed women knew of the presence of the weapon before being assaulted or threatened with it, just under two-thirds of the respondents said that they did not report their perpetrator’s possession of an unlicensed weapon to the authorities or take other actions in order to prevent or respond to GBV. As we have seen, in 77.5% of the cases the weapons belonging to the respondents’ perpetrators were unlicensed. This could indicate women’s, as well as the wider Lebanese society’s, lack of awareness and recognition of how weapons are used to commit GBV. This latter finding is supported by other aspects of this research, such as by the fact that the interviewed associations reported that they had never received training on how to effectively respond to weapons-related GBV; and also the lack of aggregated data both the associations and ISF hold which classifies and quantifies incidents, outcomes and the instrument used to perpetrate weapons-related violence in incidents of GBV (LECORVAW 2020; RDFL 2021; KAFA 2021).Footnote 11 Second, this result could also indicate that the lack of reporting or preventative measures reflects women’s fear of repercussions, and that men’s possession of SALW is so widely accepted that it cannot be challenged, and/or belief that enforcement action by the ISF or legal protection are so limited in their application.

6.2 Overview of survey findings: perceptions of effectiveness of statutory provisions

The most revealing aspects of the survey concerned the mismatch between women’s experiences and the instruments designed to protect them, outlined through the following analysis of participants’ knowledge, use, and experiences of the effectiveness of statutory instruments. These findings support our call for better implementation of the laws by Lebanon’s security sector and the judicial system in order to ensure that perpetrators are held to account and women gain the confidence of knowing that by reporting GBV effective action will be taken.

Over four-fifths (82.5%) of the surveyed women confirmed that they were aware of the existence of Lebanon’s gun laws, namely the 1959 Lebanese Decree and the Lebanese Penal Code. This indicates that they had a relatively high awareness of the existence of the laws, and that the failure to effectively use them is likely to lie elsewhere, such as in these three factors. Firstly, the inadequacy of the procedures for reporting incidents of weapon-related violence to the relevant authorities or associations, as per their protection rights under the Domestic Violence Law and Lebanon’s legal duty under the ATT. This may reflect the disconnect between perception and reality, as evidenced in the survey, that when a weapons-related GBV incident is reported, nothing meaningful happens. Secondly, loose gun laws are failing to regulate the possession of unlicensed weapons and their ‘proper use’ which contributes to normalising their existence. And thirdly, the permissive gun culture, upheld by socio-cultural norms which favour and normalise men’s right to own and use weapons over ensuring women’s protection, which therefore sustains the absence of peace.

The survey asked its participants about the accessibility, functionality, and effectiveness of the protection procedures enacted in the Domestic Violence Law and Lebanese Penal Code. Concerning the accessibility of the reporting procedure, the survey asked whether they had reported the perpetrator to anyone or an official body: 65% answered no, whilst 30% answered yes. A second question asked whether anyone had reported the incident of weapons-related violence on the victim’s behalf, to which 34 of the 40 respondents (85%) answered no, whilst five of the surveyed women (12.5%) answered yes. When those who answered yes to either of the above questions were asked to whom the incident was reported, 32.5% of those answered civil society associations and 22.5% answered friends or family. The remainder opted against sharing this information. The fact that no one reported the incidents through the official route, namely via the ISF, however, is significant and indicates women’s mistrust of the system that should be enforcing the law. Although associations can play an important role here in offering protection to survivors of GBV, they require appropriate training in order to best support them. The high proportion of respondents who neither self-reported the weapons-related GBV incident nor had it reported on their behalf also explicitly demonstrates the failure of the system. Further, it indicates the lack of awareness or willingness, at a political and societal level, to recognise the link between GBV and SALW nor to take effective action in response.

Indeed, the high percentage of women who answered that no one reported the incident on their behalf could in part be attributed to the community’s compliance with violence perpetrated against women which is linked to their belief that they have no right to interfere with a man’s private affairs or fear of the potential retaliation of the man which could come about following reporting. For those women who knew of their husband’s or relative’s possession of an unlicensed weapon, they said that they were afraid to report it out of fear of the repercussions they would face, including a threat to their own life, forced divorce, losing their children, or suffering from societal shame. As the survey participant Kholoud explained, her husband regularly threatens to kill her or her brother with his weapon if she disobeys him, which includes leaving the house without his permission, or if she reports his possession of an unlicensed weapon to the Lebanese authorities. These results clearly evidence that there is an innate flaw in the system as women are unable to report incidents of GBV related to weapons in the first place.

The efficacy of the reporting procedures and scope of the domestic laws, for cases where incidents were reported, was also investigated through the survey. Firstly, a question asked the participants if the associations they reported to informed the relevant security forces: 52.5% answered no, whilst 27.5% answered yes. The survey also showed that 72.5% of women reported that no legal action against their perpetrator was taken following the reporting of the complaint, whilst 10% claimed that the necessary legal action was taken. A total of 17.5% of women preferred not to comment on this. These results indicate the systemic flaws in the procedural and legal mechanisms in place which purport to protect women from weapons-related violence. For those women who did report incidents of weapons-related GBV to the associations, 55% reported that they were not informed of their rights under the domestic laws, whilst 40% reported that they were.

The survey also asked its participants about what happened after they were threatened by weapons-related violence. The results showed that no measures were taken against 42.5% of men who possessed an unlicensed weapon used in a GBV incident. The reasons for this include women not reporting the incidents to the relevant authorities, women being accustomed to the presence or threat of the use of weapons, or the scope or procedures of national laws being inadequate. The results also showed that only 22.5% of the women reported that the perpetrator’s weapons were confiscated after being reported in accordance with the law, 7.5% answered that the perpetrator was arrested, and 7.5% did not report this.

Whilst there are some associations such as KAFA and Resource Center for Gender Equality (ABAAD) in Lebanon that are committed to informing victims of GBV of their rights under the Domestic Violence Law and providing protective measures such as safe housing, only 40% of the women surveyed were aware of this law while 55% were not when they resorted to seeking help from associations.

As already mentioned, all three of the interviewed associations which operate on the ground and directly with GBV victims in Lebanon, KAFA, RDFL, and LECORVAW, confirmed that they had not received training to professionally advise women about their rights under the Domestic Violence law, nor about its nature and procedural implementation, in response to weapons-related violence. Indeed, it is noted from the survey that only 27.5% of the women sought help from associations and had their cases reported by them to the relevant Lebanese authorities. The percentage of women who reported to associations but did not have their cases reported to the authorities was 55%.

In brief, the survey results presented in this subsection suggest the failure of both the official reporting system and the implementation of the Domestic Violence Law and ATT. This is characterised firstly by the majority of the respondents not reporting weapons-related GBV in the first place due to their fear of facing repercussions or mistrust in the system, and secondly by the lack of effective action and correct implementation of the Domestic Violence law and the ATT after women followed the reporting procedures. Two interlinked questions that are raised here, therefore, concern firstly the extent of the role played by the associations concerned with the protection and education of women, and secondly the limitations on the capacity of the associations to raise awareness and challenge socio-cultural norms and lack of awareness about both GBV and the significance of SALW in perpetuating violence against women.

7 Conclusions and policy recommendations

This paper documents original research using mixed methods to capture, document, and interrogate the understandings and lived experiences of the legal and normative framework and the nature of GBV in Lebanon, the extent of the illicit proliferation and possession of SALW, and the connections between the two. Rather than claiming to provide a comprehensive picture of the situation, our results should be seen as providing a snapshot of issues. Nevertheless, as the first study of its kind, the research is intended to offer a useful framework that future studies can build on.

It also sets out domestic and international laws aimed at restricting SALW and preventing GBV, and evaluates the effectiveness of these. It suggests that existing provisions are inadequate: SALW remain in circulation and their rate is increasing in Lebanon, and GBV caused by weapons is a real problem, despite the implementation of measures aimed at preventing it.

How could this situation be addressed? An integrated legal system must be formulated in collaboration between the ISF and civil society to protect women from weapons-related violence and provide an accessible reporting process, while ensuring that the protective mechanisms the laws provide are effective. Lebanese civil society must take more responsibility for advancing women’s rights in order to put pressure on religious communities and ultimately amend the Personal Status Law. Civil society and the Lebanese government must actively work to depoliticise SALW. This is to frame the debate as a gendered issue and one that affects civilians, not just a national security issue. This can be achieved by raising awareness of the correlation between GBV and weapons-related violence and explicitly acknowledging the danger SALW pose to civilians. ISF and GBV associations need to effectively classify and record crimes committed through weapons to support further research in this field. Reform proposals should be developed that build on the work of GBV associations in the area of national legal frameworks to incorporate a gendered perspective aiming to ultimately address gender inequality and promote women’s rights. Finally, civil society bodies, both GBV and peacebuilding associations, should actively participate in the implementation of Lebanon’s NAP and should pressure the government and responsible institutions to fulfil their reporting obligations to the ATT, including adopting a gender-sensitive approach.

8 List of interviews

  • Abi Allam, Fadi 2021. Interviewed by Shirine Jurdi. [In-person] PPM Office, Beirut, Lebanon. 15 January.

  • KAFA. 2021. Interviewed by Roua Dandachi. [In-person] Beirut, Lebanon. 14 January.

  • LECORVAW. 2020. Interviewed by Roua Dandachi. [In-person] Al-Bireh, Aqqar, Lebanon. 29 December.

  • RDFL. 2021. Interviewed by Roua Dandachi. [In-person] Bekka Valley, Lebanon. 02 January.

  • Sharika Wa Laken. 2020. Interviewed by Roua Dandachi. [In-person] Beirut, Lebanon. 30 December.