Our Clarifying Moment: A Global Call to Action
Publication last updated: February 29, 2024
As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP), the leading nonpartisan global peacebuilding network of 200+ members operating in 181 countries working to end violent conflict and build sustainable peace, urges the U.S. and international community to provide sustained support for the Ukrainian people—especially through conflict and atrocity prevention efforts—to address the conflict’s existential threats to global peace, security, and democracy. The war continues to bring immense suffering and humanitarian need, destruction, and devastating atrocities. The landscape of international conflict has changed greatly since the Russian invasion of 2022, with new crises in Sudan, Israel-Palestine, and other contexts requiring the attention of donors and policymakers. Yet, this multitude of crises does not erase the severity of the situation in Ukraine, nor should it undermine concerted efforts to build peace and preserve democracy in Ukraine, which fundamentally connect to peace and democracy in the world writ large.
The war in Ukraine has wreaked havoc on all fronts, ravaging the country’s population and surrounding communities. Over two years, the war has caused more than 30,000 civilian casualties and will require almost $500 billion in reconstruction over the next decade. 17.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The conflict continues to disproportionately harm women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and other vulnerable communities. Evidence of atrocities, including wilful killing, torture, rape and other sexual violence, and the deportation of children, continues to emerge.
The conflict remains a major battle in the global fight for democracy, as democratic backsliding is underway in every region of the world. Russia’s economy has shown impressive resilience to Western sanctions, and Russian leaders have been emboldened by recent military gains and wavering support for Ukraine from the U.S. The recent death of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny underscores the dangers facing Russian citizens who speak out against the Russian government’s authoritarian practices.
The world is a different place compared to February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine. The war in Sudan is now the world’s largest displacement crisis, more than 1% of Gaza’s child population has been killed in the Israel-Hamas war, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo now has more people in humanitarian need than any other country in the world. However, new and future crises must not divert attention or resources away from or undermine prevention efforts in Ukraine. Conflict and atrocity prevention occur on a continuum and are possible at any phase of a conflict—and it is not too late for the U.S. and international community to take concerted action to prevent more violence.
Today, the world must reaffirm its commitment to conflict and atrocity prevention in Ukraine. This commitment must come in the form of robust gender- and conflict-sensitive assistance that supports civilian protection and peacebuilding efforts, as well as diplomacy that centers conflict and atrocity prevention. The U.S. and its allies must use all available diplomatic and financial means to prevent further harm to civilians and reduce humanitarian needs in Ukraine and the region.
AfP issues this call to action for all donors and policymakers to maintain and expand resources and solidarity with the Ukrainian people in their struggle to build peace and protect democracy. The world must not become distracted by other crises, or lose faith in Ukraine’s efforts to stand for peace, prosperity, and freedom. The international community should use this moment of multiple and compounding global crises to undertake a fundamental shift in international development, peace and security, and diplomacy efforts away from crisis response and pivot toward prevention. By addressing the drivers of violent conflict and atrocities, multilateral institutions, governments, diverse sectors, and individuals can promote peace, protect civilians, seek accountability for violations of human rights and international law, and provide relief to all those in need. With a unified voice, we must call for de-escalation, an immediate cessation of hostilities, inclusive diplomacy, and unimpeded humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance. We urge the global community to act urgently and in concert in support of the Ukrainian people and center their voices in building a future of sustainable peace and democracy.
Read AfP’s full call to action—as well as its topline recommendations and individual sections—through the links below.
Ensure Robust Funding to Address the Crisis in Ukraine
International and bilateral donors must urgently fund programs that support the current crisis in Ukraine. An estimated 17.6 million people in Ukraine will require humanitarian assistance in 2024. As of February 2024, there are nearly 3.7 million people internally displaced and nearly 6 million Ukrainian refugees scattered around Europe. Approximately 4.5 million Ukrainians have returned to the country after initially fleeing the conflict. These displaced communities show a decreasing willingness to return due to the untenable security situation and concerns over lack of access to livelihoods and housing. Furthermore, one-in-12—more than 600,000—Ukrainian children who were displaced by the war and returned home now face “extreme needs relating to their family's livelihoods, health, and threats to their safety.”
While many countries and donors have made robust commitments to support Ukraine, the amount of aid actually provided is much lower. The United Nations 2024 humanitarian response plan seeks more than $3 billion to assist Ukrainians urgently in need of aid and protection. As of February 2024, only $345 million (around 11%) of the appeal has been funded. $273 billion has been committed in assistance to Ukraine, mostly by the U.S. and European Union (EU). EU institutions and members have pledged $155 billion to Ukraine since January 2022. However, EU institutions and members have only allocated $83 billion, with the amount delivered much less. The U.S. has delivered 87% of its pledged $73 billion. In a major win for nonmilitary assistance for Ukraine, after overcoming resistance from Hungary, the European Council took the final step in February 2024 to approve a pledged $54 billion for Ukraine through 2027 for reconstruction and macro-financial aid.
Unfortunately, as the Russian military targets civilians and large swaths of the Ukrainian population remain displaced, humanitarian suffering will continue. While humanitarian assistance is vital, peacebuilding programs and ensuring the delivery of aid through a conflict-sensitive lens are equally critical.
Immediate actions needed:
Given the continuing nature and massive scale of humanitarian need in Ukraine, UN member states must quickly increase and sustain their contributions to answer the appeal to support 2024 humanitarian response plans and the urgent needs of the Ukrainian people.
President Biden must ensure that a significant portion of U.S. assistance supports peacebuilding, nonviolent civil resistors, human rights monitoring, atrocities prevention and documentation, combatting mis/disinformation, as well as psychosocial, gender-responsive, and trauma-informed programming—not just security and humanitarian needs.
Integrate support and resources for peacebuilding, conflict and atrocities prevention, and holistic social cohesion programming—beyond merely security and humanitarian efforts—within the pledged €138 billion from the EU and its member states.
Donors must follow through on their commitments made at the Ukraine Recovery Conference and utilize the committed assistance to advance peacebuilding practices and programs, as well as tackle humanitarian suffering. Donors should enhance funding for democracy, governance, and movement-building programming, as well as cybersecurity and countering mis/disinformation efforts in Ukraine, regional governments, and civil society. Donors should invest in data security mechanisms to assist in the collection, preservation, and authentication of potential evidence of war crimes and other atrocities. Donors must also support quality independent media and journalist protection efforts, both of which are vital.
Donors must fully support and fund the Framework of Cooperation between Ukraine and the UN and its implementation plan to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Ukraine to help strengthen national policies aimed at addressing CRSV, protection measures for displaced persons, and survivors support services. UN Member States should also fully fund and support the UN’s Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict’s efforts to train and provide operational support to the specialized unit on CRSV in Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General. Donors should also support initiatives like JurFem: Support and the Survivor Relief Centre in Chernivtsi, which offers assistance to sexual and gender-based violence survivors.
Donors must continue to address the displacement-induced human trafficking and exploitation, particularly of women and children, and provide support for immediate measures to prevent and respond. Resources should be utilized to train governments, law enforcement and immigration control, civil society, and volunteers working at the borders and in resettlement to recognize the signs of human trafficking and how to report and respond to it through a survivor-centered, trauma-informed, and gender-sensitive approach. Donors should also support information dissemination to refugees about the threat of trafficking.
With women and children comprising the majority of Ukrainian refugees in Europe, accounting for 47% and 33% of the total population respectively, donors must fund efforts to provide safe and quality education. These efforts should also support refugee children struggling to adjust to school in new countries, assist children with special needs, and work through schools and community centers to help children process the impacts of the conflict on their lives.
Donors must work to support those who are unable or unwilling to evacuate, including populations with disabilities and the elderly. Specifically, donors should provide dignified aid, including facilitating humanitarian aid access, to the elderly and people with disabilities, especially livelihood support specific to individual needs.
Donors must work to meet the unique needs of returnees to Ukraine and those in communities liberated from Russian control, including housing, heating appliances, electricity, installation of glass for broken windows in war-torn regions, fuel, cash assistance, and medicine and health services, especially mental health services. Donors must scale up support to address the severe winterization needs and ensure the provision of blankets, heaters, and other infrastructure to ensure health and safety. Additionally, donors must continue to address the needs of those affected by the Kakhovk Dam collapse and subsequent flooding, including need for access to safe water, sanitation, and rebuilding of infrastructure.
Social cohesion assistance—such as language training, facilitating engagement of refugee and displaced populations with local and municipal government structures, employment training, and refugee/displacement-focused government agencies—must also be integrated to support both refugees/displaced persons and host communities to relieve the impact on host communities, prevent tensions, and promote social cohesion. A major source of tension is often related to misinformation and fears of economic costs—to combat this, host communities can organize joint activities between host populations and refugees/displaced persons so they can get to know each other, as well as share positive stories on social media to counter misinformation.
Donors must provide flexibility in new and existing funding streams for organizations currently operating in Ukraine and the region to address the evolving crisis, including evacuation, relocation, and protection, and scale the availability to small grant mechanisms for civil society.
Donors and aid groups must work to decentralize aid and humanitarian assistance efforts in the region to ensure that neglected regions of Ukraine receive sufficient support.
All donors must ensure support provided to address the conflict and regional implications is additive, not reallocated from other conflict-affected and fragile states or global crises.
Governments should consider the use of a Multilateral Asset Transfer to redirect the roughly $350 billion in frozen Russian assets to support Ukrainian reconstruction and reparations for Russian-perpetrated atrocities, which the Biden Administration has reportedly been exploring as of early 2024.
Rapidly and Flexibly Fund Locally-Led Peacebuilding and Protection and Support Nonviolent Civil Resistors
Locally-led peacebuilding and funding must be a critical component of the international response to the conflict in Ukraine. Activists, human rights defenders, and ordinary civilians engaging in nonviolent action and civil resistance to challenge military aggression and uphold basic rights and freedoms in Ukraine and the region require assistance to effectively prevent violence and achieve sustainable peace. The international community must look ahead beyond the immediate conflict to create local buy-in and ensure the capacity at all levels of Ukrainian society to participate in dialogue and peacebuilding efforts to address social cohesion, reconstruction, and sustainable peace.
Women and civil society organizations are playing a critical role in advancing peace and security, particularly when it comes to leading humanitarian relief efforts, documenting atrocities, and managing key government and anti-corruption bodies. Unfortunately, efforts to institutionalize localization in Ukraine through international support are facing headwinds. The ICVA, a global network of humanitarian organizations, found that Ukrainian organizations do not have sufficient access to funding, and have significantly fewer funding sources than their international counterparts, which in turn has undermined local Ukrainian organizations’ policy influence. At a fundamental level, donors must consult with local actors in Ukraine and those affected by the conflict to understand what they need, want, and hope to achieve in the short, medium, and long term. Ukrainian voices must be centered in the design and implementation of all peacebuilding, dialogue, humanitarian, and diplomatic efforts—and these efforts must be gender-sensitive, conflict-sensitive, and trauma-informed.
Immediate actions needed:
Donors must provide rapid and flexible funding for local organizations, activists, movements, formal and informal networks, and volunteers working in Ukraine and in the region, especially organizations that are led by and work on issues affecting women and youth, who are disproportionately impacted by violent conflict. Gender analysis of the conflict shows that it is exacerbating gender inequalities; women and children account for 80% of Ukrainian refugees, and analysis by UN Women estimates that 3.6 million people are in urgent need of gender-based violence (GBV) services in the country as of February 2024. While women are playing a critical role in humanitarian response, they are not fully involved in decision-making. The risk of sexual and gender-based violence, in particular, is compounded for those experiencing multiple forms of marginalization, such as women with disabilities. The U.S. should issue targeted sanctions on individuals perpetrating CRSV by leveraging the November 2022 Presidential Memorandum on Promoting Accountability for CRSV. Other governments and institutions should also issue sanctions against individuals perpetrating or commanding CRSV as a means of supporting local Ukrainians and the gendered violence of the conflict.
Donors must also work to protect and support LGBTQI+ populations, which are often excluded from humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts due to discrimination and marginalization, through direct funding of local LGBTQI+-serving partners, such as Outright International’s LGBTQ emergency fund, LGBTQI+-serving groups, and emergency assistance to LGBTQI+ individuals. In addition, specific support must be provided to LGBTQI+ individuals who may be fleeing across borders into countries with hostile attitudes and/or laws, such as for safe housing, transportation, and medical care, as well as guidance on how to navigate a new country’s landscape.
Donors should also provide general operating support in addition to capacity-strengthening resources and dedicated long-term funding for civil society beyond six-month windows or flash grants to support humanitarian assistance and protection. This shift in funding can help aid groups scale up their humanitarian presence and dedicate more attention to the elderly and people with disabilities. It can also create more focused and sustainable support for Ukrainians returning to their homes in conflict-affected regions. Donors must also adjust their response modalities and operations to better prepare and accommodate emergent crises like the June 2023 dam collapse or the February 2024 fall of Avdiivka. Modifications could include more flexibility within budgets to allow faster crisis response that is not impacted by project constraints.
Donors and international peacebuilding organizations must ensure that all support to Ukrainian civil society is locally-led and owned. They should consider departing from conventional assistance mechanisms and direct funds as requested and needed by local activists, allowing for adaptation as dynamics shift. For instance, provide support for salaries and operational costs to facilitate the work on the ground.
Donors should require close coordination between international non-governmental organizations and local organizations/partners to facilitate flexible program implementation/aid delivery and close gaps in risk sharing to ensure local staff/volunteer security, enhance their capacity, and address local needs.
Donors, governments, multilateral institutions, and civil society must support unarmed civilian protection to nonviolently protect civilians and enhance the safety and security of frontline humanitarian and peacebuilding actors. Governments and civil society organizations should establish coordination hubs to provide unarmed activists, human rights defenders, and civic leaders from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and elsewhere in the region engaged in internationally-protected nonviolent action and civil resistance with diplomatic, legal, and material assistance, in line with international best practices. Donors must ensure the inclusion of women, youth, LGBTQI+ persons, faith actors, and other marginalized communities in all peacebuilding initiatives and peace processes, in accordance with the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace, and Security Agendas.
Millions of Ukrainians are experiencing and will continue to suffer from trauma and other severe mental health issues due to the war. To help alleviate mental health issues, donors and the international community should provide psychosocial support and psychological first aid, as well as support existing efforts, such as the National Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Program, an initiative of First Lady Olena Zelenska to help Ukrainians “overcome war-related stress and the consequences of experiencing traumatic events,” and the training of psychologists for Ukrainian schools. Donors and the international community should scale up in-person and virtual mental health and psychosocial support for civilians, as well as aid workers, volunteers, first responders, and emergency crews.
Donors, governments, and civil society must support programs that boost social cohesion and resilience and facilitate mediation and peacebuilding for communities dealing with resettlement and the impacts of the conflict. Programs aimed at building social cohesion are essential because new inequalities or conflicts can arise within host communities of IDPs and refugees. To mitigate these risks, inclusive policies, trust-building, and mutual support and development initiatives are essential.
The humanitarian response has been largely volunteer-based and thus lacks specialists in data risk protection and analysis, which increases the probability of data hacking or online threats. To mitigate data risks or challenges, donors should ensure that funding includes allowances for mainstreaming protection risk analysis to address concerns related to civilian consent, data privacy, and security.
The international community must amplify the voices of the Ukrainian people working toward peace, diplomacy, and democracy through the press, social media, and other information outlets with the express consent and identity protection as needed. Media outlets, donors, and non-governmental institutions should immediately remove all photos, names, voices, and other personal identifying information of Ukrainians and local partners that may be subject to retaliation by Russian forces. They should also submit links to pages on their website with sensitive information on Google Search Console to ensure they are also removed from Google's cache and reverse image search any particularly sensitive images to see if they are cross-posted.
Strengthen and Mobilize Multilateral Institutions
United Nations
After Russia vetoed a resolution deploring its aggression against Ukraine on February 25, 2022, the Security Council voted to call for a rare emergency special session of the 193-member United Nations (UN) General Assembly. At such point, only 10 such emergency special sessions of the General Assembly had been convened since 1950, following the adoption of Resolution 377A(V), widely known as “Uniting for Peace Resolution.” In the ensuing emergency session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Russia and calling on it to cease hostilities and withdraw its military forces from Ukraine, demonstrating remarkable unity within the international community.
During its 11th emergency special session at the end of March 2022, the General Assembly adopted a resolution urging civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine. In April 2022, it voted to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council. In addition, the UN appointed three human rights experts to investigate potential violations of international humanitarian law. In May 2022, the Security Council issued its first unanimous statement on the conflict, expressing “deep concern regarding the maintenance of peace and security in Ukraine.” On October 12, 2022, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution condemning Russia’s “attempted illegal annexation” and calling on states to refrain from recognizing the four Ukrainian regions—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—where Russia held sham referenda. In February 2023, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution calling for the end of the war and Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine. Ukraine did not end up pursuing a General Assembly resolution around the two-year anniversary of the conflict due to concerns over decreasing support from Arab states given alleged double standards around the conflict in Israel-Palestine. Since February 2023, the UN has not since passed any additional General Assembly resolutions or issued any additional unanimous Security Council statements.
In addition to condemning Russian actions in Ukraine, the UN sought to address the global implications of the conflict. In July 2022, the UN launched the Black Sea Grain Initiative to facilitate the resumption of Ukrainian grain and Russian food and fertilizer exports via the Black Sea to mitigate the worldwide food insecurity crisis. The UN also created a Joint Coordination Center to monitor implementation of the deal and use of the maritime humanitarian corridor, which includes representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey. Russia suspended its participation in the deal at the end of October 2022 after it accused Ukraine of carrying out “massive air and sea strikes using drones” on its naval fleet. The mandate was ultimately extended three more times, but Russia terminated its engagement in July 2023. At the time of its termination, the deal had allowed the export of almost 33 million tons of grain and other foodstuffs. Fortunately, by the end of 2023 and early 2024, Ukrainian exports have been able to follow a new shipping route in the Black Sea through which 4.8 million tons of foodstuffs flow per month—higher than the rate under the Black Sea Grain Initiative—mainly due to Ukraine’s use of drones against Russian ships and recapturing of territory by the Danube delta. Still, Russia continues to undermine efforts to ship foodstuffs from Ukraine, including through attempted drone attacks on the port city of Odesa in January 2024.
The UN has continued to call attention to the devastating impacts of the conflict in Ukraine, including sexual violence by Russian troops, human trafficking risks for women and children, the targeting of civilian infrastructure, the deaths of “countless Ukrainian civilians,” the Kakhovka Dam collapse, and threats of Russian nuclear aggression. In March 2023, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stated that “the risk of a nuclear weapon being used is currently higher than at any time since the depths of the Cold War,” particularly given the decisions by Russian President Vladimir Putin to place nuclear weapons inside Belarusian territory and to suspend Russia’s participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). During a December 2023 UN Security Council meeting, numerous country representatives voiced concern over Moscow’s threat of nuclear weapons use.
In September 2022, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine on Ukraine confirmed the commission of war crimes by Russian forces, The Commission, in conjunction with the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), released a report in March 2023, which documents evidence of alleged war crimes, including attacks on civilians and energy-related infrastructure, wilful killings, unlawful confinement, torture, rape and other sexual violence, as well as unlawful transfers and deportations of children. The Commission submitted another report to the General Assembly in October 2023 that confirmed additional evidence that Russian authorities have committed violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, and corresponding crimes, in areas that came under their control in Ukraine. A May 2023 report by OHCHR highlighted the disproportionate effect the conflict has had on older populations in Ukraine. Although people over the age of 60 are only 25% of the population, they comprised 32% of civilians killed in the first year of the war. In June 2023, the UN placed Russia on its annual blacklist of countries that violate the rights of children due to the killing of children and intentional targeting of hospitals and schools. As of February 2024, the conflict in Ukraine has left more than 7,000 schools in Ukraine inaccessible and led to learning losses for 5.3 million Ukrainian children.
Immediate actions needed:
The UN must continue to take sustained action as long as Russian aggression persists and reject future veto attempts by Russia on UN action, pursuant to Art. 27(3) of the UN Charter, which requires parties to a dispute to abstain from voting.
The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry must continue to meticulously investigate and document alleged human rights abuses by Russia. The UN and other donors must continue to robustly fund and support the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to gather evidence and document human rights abuses and violations of international law to support future prosecutions and reparations claims
UN members must also support peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming globally through a strengthened UN Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office, increased contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund, and better-equipped conflict resolution programs in the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the World Bank.
The UN must ensure that other ongoing crises, such as in Israel-Palestine and Sudan, do not reduce attention and resources for the crisis in Ukraine, but rather re-emphasize the need for assistance that prioritizes protection and prevention of further violence and atrocities around the world.
In the future, the UN must not shy away from calling emergency sessions of the General Assembly for conflicts. The UN must use the “Uniting for Peace” General Assembly power to take up matters of international peace and security so no country can veto UN actions, as opposed to the Security Council, which is often unable to act because of the lack of unanimity among its five veto-wielding permanent members.
The European Union
The European Union (EU) has taken significant action to condemn and respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As of February 2024, the EU has adopted 13 sanctions packages targeting Russia. All together, these packages sanctioned more than 2,100 individuals and entities and froze more than $23 billion of assets in the EU. The sanctions have imposed strict restrictions on imports and exports, as well as on Russian state-owned enterprises and its financial, technology, and other sectors, and removed 10 Russian and four Belarusian banks from the SWIFT banking system. The EU has also shut down EU airspace for Russian aircraft and banned numerous Russian state-owned media outlets. The EU has also banned Russian coal imports, banned seaborne oil from Russia, and set price caps for Russian petroleum products. These efforts have greatly reduced the EU’s reliance on Russian energy imports, decreasing its dependence on Russian gas from 45% in 2021 to 15% in 2023.
EU sanctions over the conflict are expanding beyond Russia; the 10th sanctions package included seven Iranian entities that manufactured drones used by Russia. The 11th round is focused on restricting trade that supports the Russian war efforts, including through third-party countries that trade with both the EU and Russia and for materials that assist the Russian security sector. The 12th package added 29 Russian and third-country entities associated with Russia’s war effort, including in Uzbekistan and Singapore. The 13th package targeted an additional 140 companies and individuals involved in Russia’s military; 10 Russian companies and individuals involved in the shipping of North Korean arms to Russia; six Russian judges and 10 Russian officials in the occupied territory of Ukraine; and almost 20 individuals and entities involved in the forced transfer, deportation, and military indoctrination of Ukrainian children, including in Belarus. Despite the speed and breadth of the European sanctions regime, a lack of unanimity persists, providing loopholes for specific sectors. For instance, Austria, Slovakia, Italy, and Croatia continue to receive Russian gas via long-term contracts with Russian company Gazprom. Additionally, the EU’s imports of Russian nuclear fuel and services increased in 2023 compared to 2021.
On June 23, 2022, the EU granted candidate status to Ukraine and set out seven conditions that Ukraine must complete before accession. In December 2023, the EU agreed to begin accession talks with Ukraine, which could still take a decade or longer. The bloc has also worked to mitigate the challenges of winter and losses in energy infrastructure through the Ukraine Energy Support Fund. Thus far, the EU has pledged to provide more than $150 billion in total assistance to Ukraine, but has actually allocated only $83 billion.
In March 2022, the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive to provide visa-free entry and equitable assistance, asylum, and the right to employment to all refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine. In the fall of 2023, the EU extended the Directive until March 2025. By the end of 2023, more than 4.3 million people lived under the Directive in the EU. However, a December 2023 report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights noted challenges in the Directive’s implementation around provision of education, housing, employment, and healthcare due to overburdened local authorities and scarce resources. The EU must take further coordinated action to mitigate the humanitarian impact of the conflict and work toward a nonviolent solution.
Immediate actions needed:
Utilize all diplomatic and economic tools to ensure member agreement to urgently phase out imports of Russian oil, natural gas, and uranium while maintaining energy security and protecting civilians from rising energy costs, including providing resources and assistance for countries particularly reliant on Russian fossil fuels. The EU must work to promote energy independence and security, particularly from Russian oil that arrives via pipeline.
Use this situation, which highlights the interconnected and compounding nature of climate change and conflict, to accelerate planned transitions to renewable and climate-neutral energy to prevent a repeat situation that benefits bad actors in fossil fuel-rich states.
Close outstanding loopholes related to Russian imports and expand the current EU sanctions regime to include special interest sectors currently omitted, as well as any countries and companies that are supplying arms to Russia for the conflict in Ukraine.
Scale the humanitarian assistance for conflict-affected civilians from Ukraine, and in-kind assistance and emergency operations to expedite the delivery of material assistance via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.
Prepare and identify funds and programs for long-term humanitarian and development support to Ukraine and the region, including conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
Ensure sustained implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive by EU member states to assist refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine beyond the rights and aid provided under the Directive. The EU must continue to disseminate guidelines and increase the capacity of EU member states to receive, process, and support refugees fleeing Ukraine and address these challenges. Following the challenges observed in the EU’s December 2023 report on implementing the Directive, the EU must work with local governments to increase public accommodation capacity that considers the unique needs of women, children, and the elderly; bolstering school capacity for displaced students and ensuring coordination between national and local authorities when enrolling displaced children in schools; reducing burdensome procedures in order for displaced individuals to have their professional qualifications recognized; and reducing healthcare burdens and insufficient or delayed insurance coverage for displaced under the Directive.
Continue to provide emergency and long-term support through the Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) and ensure EU member states have the requisite funds and flexibility to address the needs of refugees fleeing the conflict in Ukraine.
Create a regional coordinator to work in tandem with UN counterparts—including the UN Regional Refugee Coordinator for the Ukraine Situation—and oversee the protection and assistance of Ukrainian refugees throughout EU member states and utilization of the Solidarity Platform, created in May 2022, to help facilitate information-sharing between members.
State parties to the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings must uphold their commitments to prevent and combat human trafficking and implement the Common Anti-Trafficking Plan to protect Ukrainian refugees. Reports abound of Ukrainian refugees facing human trafficking as they flee the conflict, who are being subjected to cruel labor and sexual exploitation. Countries accepting refugees must immediately bolster coordination and border crossings and reception facilities to ensure accurate refugee registration, as well as access to documentation and psychosocial, gender-sensitive, and trauma-informed support. They must also work to inform refugees of the risk of and prevent fraudulent offers of housing, transportation, and work and take urgent measures to protect women and unaccompanied children, who are at heightened risk.
Continue to support the amended mandate of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) to assist Ukraine with the investigation and prosecution of international crimes perpetrated during the conflict and promote civilian security.
Provide substantial resources and financial support to the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation and the International Center for the Prosecution of Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine to investigate crimes in Ukraine and facilitate cooperation between EU members and the International Criminal Court, and support non-governmental organizations documenting atrocities and providing assistance to survivors and other conflict-affected civilians.
Expedite the delivery of the dedicated €50 billion and provide sustained support to advance Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU accession through the Ukraine Facility for 2024 - 2027.
Integrate peacebuilding, conflict prevention, conflict sensitivity, gender sensitivity, and a trauma-informed approach across all EU assistance for Ukraine.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that it will not send troops to Ukraine in response to the Russian invasion, the alliance is coordinating Ukrainian requests for assistance, supporting aid delivery, increasing munitions stockpiles, and enhancing the resiliency of energy and undersea infrastructure. It also deployed defensive forces to the eastern countries in the bloc and increased the number of ships in the Baltic and North Seas.
Following decades of neutrality, Finland joined NATO in April 2023. In February 2024, Hungary’s parliament voted to approve Sweden’s accession to NATO after being the last remaining holdout. The addition of Finland to NATO is significant, as the country will provide the alliance with a “well-trained military that is poised to defend its 832-mile border with Russia.” Similarly, Sweden brings highly capable armed forces in proximity to the Russian border, and its accession to NATO—a break from its traditionally neutral foreign policy—could be a positive signal for other undecided countries to back Ukraine. Ukraine formally submitted its application for membership in September 2022 after Russia annexed four Ukrainian provinces and held sham referenda therein. NATO has since agreed upon a new multi-year assistance program to facilitate the transition of Ukraine’s armed forces to NATO standards, rebuild their security sector and critical infrastructure, and winter and demining equipment, but declined to formally invite Ukraine to formally join the alliance. In November 2023, the NATO-Ukraine Council—which was launched at the July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius as a joint body for Ukraine and NATO to advance political dialogue, engagement, and cooperation—met for the first time at the level of foreign ministers, after which the Council issued a statement reaffirming the multi-year program and announced NATO’s intentions to support Ukraine’s deterrence and defense in the long-term. The statement also mentioned NATO’s plans to develop “a roadmap for Ukraine’s transition to full interoperability with NATO.” NATO must now take additional action to ensure regional security. In February 2024, NATO announced it would establish a new NATO-Ukraine joint analysis, training, and education center, in which Ukrainian forces can share lessons learned from their war with Russia and train with allies.
Immediate actions needed:
Utilize the NATO-Ukraine Council to develop a coordinated approach to advance political dialogue, address Russian aggression in Ukraine, and facilitate Ukraine’s accession to NATO membership.
Develop policy tools and deterrence measures to protect NATO members along its eastern front in Europe and prevent Russia from escalating its aggression further in the region.
Ensure sustained assistance through the Comprehensive Assistance Package and trust funds to address current needs and long-term, post-conflict reconstruction and reform.
Leverage NATO expansion, especially with the additions of Finland and Sweden, as a diplomatic tool to modify Russia’s behavior and advance negotiations to end the conflict.
Urgently provide the resources dedicated during and since the July 2023 Vilnius Summit to continue to bring Ukraine closer to NATO, particularly humanitarian-focused resources such as demining assistance, fuel, and winter equipment, as well as reconstruction of critical infrastructure.
Coordinate a large-scale strategic communications campaign aimed at the civilians of NATO countries to clearly explain why it is in member states’ best interests to provide ongoing, substantial assistance to Ukraine and how it will promote peace and security.
International Courts
In March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that the Office was opening an investigation into the Situation in Ukraine, a positive development in efforts to ensure accountability over Russian aggression and alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. The referral of the case by 43 state parties to the Rome Statute expedited the investigation, the largest ever in ICC history, with numerous ICC teams deploying to Ukraine to interview witnesses and collect evidence. The EU’s EuroJust created a Joint Investigation Team for Ukraine (JIT), which consists of Ukraine, six EU members, and the ICC. This is the first time the ICC has joined a JIT to collect and share information, coordinate investigations, and hold perpetrators to account. Additionally, the International Centre for the Prosecution of Crimes of Aggression (ICPA), located in The Hague, officially began its work in July 2023, to coordinate with the ICC and JIT to investigate, collect data, interview victims, and preserve evidence of the crimes committed during the war.
In July 2022, 45 countries signed a compact to provide $20 million to support the ICC’s investigation and coordinate international efforts. In March 2023, an international conference raised an additional $4.9 million to support the ICC’s work. That month, the ICC issued arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova for the war crimes of unlawful deportation of children and unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Ukraine, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and others, however, are calling for the establishment of a special criminal tribunal to prosecute high-level Russian officials for the crime of aggression—for which the ICC lacks jurisdiction, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute—as well as other international crimes, though such a tribunal has not been established as of February 2024.
In March 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) required Russia to immediately cease military operations in Ukraine. Russia’s refusal to appear before the ICJ does not absolve it from the Court’s jurisdiction or the ruling. The ICJ also affirmed that no evidence exists of acts of genocide by the Ukrainian government, which Russia used as a justification for its aggression. This finding serves as a powerful fact-check to Russian propaganda. The ICJ’s ruling further buttresses the European Court of Human Rights’ call for Russia to stop attacking civilians and civilian objects.
However, in February 2024, the ICJ ruled that the Court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether Russia’s uses of force against Ukraine were justified based on (even false) claims of genocide, shooting down a Ukrainian claim that the spread of disinformation gave rise to a dispute that should be litigated by the Court under the Genocide Convention. The ICJ also ruled that it has jurisdiction over Russian claims of alleged genocide committed by Ukraine against ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine—meaning that Ukraine’s conduct and not Russia’s will be investigated by the Court. Yet, further inquiry by the Court could serve to finally dispel Russia’s claim that Ukraine committed genocide on its own territory.
The UK, U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, Sweden, Poland, and Lithuania, amongst others, have also launched investigations to support war crimes prosecutions domestically. In May 2022, the EU, US, and UK created the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine to support the investigations of Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General. In November 2023, the U.S. State Department announced it will provide $1 million to support the ICPA. Ukraine completed its first trial in mid-May 2022, sentencing a 21-year-old Russian soldier to life in prison, although the sentence was reduced to 15 years. As of February 2024, Ukrainian courts have convicted 80 Russian soldiers of war crimes, and are investigating 126,0000 alleged war crimes.
In a significant development for accountability amidst the conflict, in December 2023, the U.S. charged four Russian soldiers with war crimes against an American who was living in Ukraine during the February 2022 invasion—the first ever charges under the Justice for War Crimes Act of 2023 to prosecute war crimes against American citizens. These domestic proceedings have the opportunity to be more expedient and efficient, although the courts outside of Ukraine face the logistical barrier of jurisdiction over Russian forces. Regardless, they serve as a complementary accountability mechanism for international mechanisms as atrocities continue in real time.
Immediate actions needed:
The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor must continue to investigate the alleged crimes and provide support to the Ukrainian government, prosecutors, investigators, and civil society to collect and preserve evidence and coordinate with other investigative teams.
Individuals and organizations collecting evidence of potential crimes against humanity and war crimes should submit all findings to the Office of the Prosecutor through its dedicated portal or at otp.informationdesk@icc-cpi.int.
State parties to the ICC should immediately increase their contributions to the Court to ensure it has all the resources to comprehensively investigate the situation in Ukraine and all other cases currently under investigation.
The UN, as well as partners in the EU, should engage in a robust, open debate regarding the establishment of a special criminal tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression and ensure that any such mechanism created would complement the efforts and funding of the ICC, Ukrainian courts, and other national courts exercising universal jurisdiction.
The U.S. should scale up and adequately resource its efforts to prosecute Russian forces for war crimes against U.S. citizens via the war crimes statute. The U.S. should also increase its support for the ICPA to bolster the ICC’s and JIT’s efforts to investigate and achieve accountability for atrocities in Ukraine.
The European Court of Human Rights should extend its decision instructing Russia to “refrain from military attacks against civilians and civilian objects” as violations of not just international humanitarian law, but also international human rights law.
Domestic courts should undertake investigations, prosecute Russian perpetrators subject to their jurisdiction, share evidence, and coordinate with other international, regional, and national efforts to promote accountability.
Prevent and Document War Crimes and Atrocities
Documentation of human rights violations and atrocity crimes during active conflict is critical to advance accountability. The gathering and submission of real-time evidence in Ukraine will play a vital role in the outcome of the proceedings at the ICC, ICJ, and domestic courts. Reports by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine released in October 2022, March 2023, and October 2023 outlined evidence that Russian authorities “committed a wide range of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in many regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Many of these amount to war crimes and include wilful killings, attacks on civilians, unlawful confinement, torture, rape, and forced transfers and deportations of children.” However, partners on the ground, particularly law enforcement and civil society, require the resources necessary to gather, document, and protect evidence. Perhaps even more critically, there must be significantly more coordination, transparency, and burden-sharing amongst the numerous international, national, and civil society investigatory groups.
Immediate actions needed:
The international community must provide technical and financial support to the Ukrainian legal system, including training investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, law enforcement, and civil society to effectively collect evidence, coordinate, and conduct proceedings for war crimes and other international crimes in line with international law and best practices. Specific support, training, and advice should be given to law enforcement to enhance their forensic capacities relating to the collection of evidence of atrocities and mass graves.
Governments, donors, multilateral institutions, civil society, and individuals should disseminate resources (in English and Ukrainian) that provide guidance and capacity-building and technical guidance for civil society organizations and individuals to document human rights violations and atrocity crimes in Ukraine.
These actors should also share mobile apps, digital platforms, and other resources with Ukrainians and partners on-the-ground to capture, store, and preserve evidence of human rights violations and atrocity crimes and ensure the security of witnesses, victims, and investigators.
Individuals and organizations documenting and collecting evidence should highlight the disproportionate impacts of conflict and international crimes experienced by women, children, and other vulnerable and marginalized communities, particularly the use of rape as a weapon of war.
All interviews, investigations, and evidence collection must be completed in a gender-sensitive manner. A lack of gender lens in these investigations can lead to the experiences of women, LGBTQ+, and other groups being ignored or overlooked. All interviews, investigations, and evidence collection must also take into account conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated against men and boys. Donors, governments, and multilateral institutions must train their staff to incorporate a gender-sensitive perspective into their work.
Donors must invest in proper cataloging, storage, and analysis of images and documents to ensure their viability for international justice and accountability proceedings and support key non-governmental organizations and collaborations, such as the 5am Coalition. While funding must advance the use of technological tools to sort materials, support for human analysis is also essential. Security of digitally-stored evidence is vital to avoid manipulation, contamination, and destruction of evidence by the Russians and other nefarious actors.
Governments, donors, and multilateral institutions must efficiently and consistently coordinate their atrocities investigations to avoid duplicating efforts, ensure evidence preservation, and prevent the re-traumatization of survivors and their families.
Donors should utilize efforts to collect evidence in Ukraine to refine best practices and standards that can be scaled in other conflict- and atrocities-affected contexts.
Combat Mis/Disinformation and Promote Cybersecurity in Ukraine and Globally
Russia is fighting the conflict in Ukraine and destabilizing other countries through technology, including cyber-attacks and mis/disinformation. Between December 2021 and December 2023, an estimated 3,225 cyberattacks and operations were carried out in connection to the war in Ukraine—an average of 29 attacks per week. Many of these attacks had destructive impacts on critical sectors and platforms, such as Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecommunication service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets.
Russia has also been using mis- and disinformation across the internet and social media to sow confusion and destabilization in Ukraine and allied countries. As of February 2024, NewsGuard identified 470 websites that are “actively spreading Russian disinformation about the war.” The rapid evolution of generative artificial intelligence (AI) that can create cheap and convincing disinformation at a massive scale has serious implications for Russia’s capacity to conduct information warfare. A study published in fall 2023—which examined 5,000 tweets in the first seven months of 2022—found that AI-generated deepfakes are creating confusion among the public and media, as well as eroding trust that online users had in online discussions of the war.
Since the Russian invasion began, Meta imposed measures to prevent the dissemination of Russian propaganda about the conflict and removed dozens of sham websites and hundreds of fake social media accounts. However, alternative social media platforms frequently used by the U.S. far-right have become new breeding grounds for the spread of disinformation about the conflict. Twitter may be banned in Russia, but verified users who purchased the “Blue Check” continue to widely promote misinformation and disinformation across the platform.
As noted by the Biden Administration, enhanced and collective action by the international community is essential to stem further instability caused by Russia’s deployment of technology as a weapon of war both in Ukraine and beyond.
Immediate actions needed:
International institutions and donors must address the proliferation of mis/disinformation campaigns by Russia through substantial funding for multifaceted programming aimed at media literacy, evidence-based counter-messaging strategies, and proactive identification of potential dis/misinformation threats in Ukraine, other conflict-affected countries, the U.S., and other donor countries.
The international community must sustain efforts to push back against Russia’s destabilizing mis/disinformation campaigns. The U.S. and its allies must continue to rebuff Russian efforts by releasing intelligence reports about Russia’s actions in Ukraine and working to get this information into Russia.
Donors, governments, international institutions, civil society, and the private sector must coordinate to create standards and guardrails against the use of AI, especially AI-generated disinformation, to drive the conflict in Ukraine. These same actors should also lean into positive uses of AI for conflict and atrocity prevention and peacebuilding in Ukraine, such as AI-enhanced early warning early response mechanisms, facilitation of real-time dialogue with large groups across communities in the region, and AI-powered, large-scale, rapid identification of Russian disinformation.
Donors, governments, institutions, civil society, and individuals should share guides and disinformation tools and resources with media contacts and others to ensure responsible reporting and prevent the unintended spread of mis/disinformation. They must also support local organizations doing real-time fact-checking, debunking, and prebunking, which serve as a powerful implement in countering mis/disinformation.
Donors, governments, institutions, and civil society should leverage Ukraine’s uniquely advanced levels of digital-literate professionals and work with women, youth, and local communities to build digital resilience to Russia’s information and cyber-attacks, through frameworks such as the EUvsDisinfo platform. With a specific focus on diverse Ukrainian youth, donors should support capacity strengthening on conflict transformation, nonviolent action, digital resilience, and the development of nonviolent counternarratives in cooperation with local, national, and digital media.
Donors, governments, institutions, civil society, and individuals must work to provide cybersecurity assistance and build up cybersecurity capacity and resilience—including through digital hygiene training and data protection—for civil society and aid organizations facing Russian cyberattacks.
Donors, governments, institutions, civil society, and individuals should provide free, open-sourced, and capacity-building tools—similar to the work of The Plunk Foundation—for individuals and civil society in Ukraine to securely store files and communicate without fear of Russian cyber intrusion.
Donors must specifically support civil society organizations and actors documenting war crimes and human rights abuses to promote data security and expedite authentication as Russia continues to try to destroy evidence and undermine investigations.
Following research findings that Russian cyber actors are conducting cyberattacks alongside military attacks, technology companies and the private sector must take more aggressive action to rebuff cybersecurity threats and monitor, identify, and remove mis/disinformation, in the way that Microsoft intervened to address Russian-imposed malware on Ukrainian government and financial institutions.
Social media platforms must apply and enforce policies that consistently and urgently label and remove propaganda and mis/disinformation from Russia, including content released before they imposed restrictions, to prevent its spread and proliferation by actors beyond Russia. These companies must also put safeguards in place to ensure they do not profit from Russian mis/disinformation. Social media entities must also find creative ways to allow the stream of unsanitized, non-state-media news and information into Russia to push back against the Kremlin’s narrative surrounding the war.
The international community and international civil society must continue to pressure crucial private sector actors, such as SpaceX, to maintain telecommunications assistance to Ukraine amid the conflict through Starlink satellite services.
Mobilize the Private Sector
Private sector companies are using their considerable power to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As of February 2024, more than 1,000 businesses have publicly announced they are voluntarily pulling back operations in Russia since February 2022, including major companies such as Nike, Apple, McDonald’s, Starbucks, CocaCola, Pepsi, Nissan, Netflix, Amazon, and Danone. Energy companies are making changes, as well. Shell stated it would cease all operations in Russia and purchases of Russian oil and gas, and sold its stake in a German refinery co-owned with Russia’s Rosneft in December 2023; Exxon Mobil pulled out of its last Russian oil and natural gas project; and British Petroleum sold a significant portion of its stake in the Russian-owned oil company Rosneft. Technology companies including YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok are banning Russian state media outlets from their platforms in Europe. In addition, Google suspended all advertisements within Russia in its search engine, YouTube, and display marketing, while other major technology players such as IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and Sony ended sales in Russia. Small businesses around the world are also doing their part by removing Russian products from their shelves and prominently displaying Ukrainian goods.
However, the private sector is far from unified in its response. As of February 2024, almost 400 major multinational corporations are either defying demands to exit or reduce activities in Russia or simply holding off investments and development in Russia, including Nestle, Cloudflare, TGI Friday’s, and Guess. Additionally, some major companies like Heineken, Mondelez, Beam Suntory, and Edrington have broken their promises to leave operations in Russia. In July 2023, Ukraine designated Unilever as an “international sponsor of war” due to its continued production in Russia and millions of dollars in taxes that are thought to contribute to the war effort. Although international businesses are not completely re-engaging with Russia, the steady stream of companies pulling out of Russia or curtailing their operations has significantly slowed. The Russian Government is also making it more difficult for companies to leave by implementing additional barriers such as exit taxes.
In Ukraine, some members of the private sector are stepping up to support the government and military. Microsoft has provided $540 million in free services, technical support, equipment, and cloud storage of key government information to back up data targeted by Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine as of October 2023. Google has committed $45 million in cash and services, including using staff hours to work on projects that benefit Ukrainian refugees. As of January 2024, private sector donors have donated or pledged $1.8 billion to support crucial services, aid delivery, and the energy sector, as well as logistics, technology, job placement, and other in-kind contributions. Yet, the significant assistance that will be required in Ukraine’s reconstruction requires the private sector to go further in its approach to contribute to a whole-of-society response.
Immediate actions needed:
Completely end business activity in and with Russia, including halting purchases of Russian products and divesting from stock, pension plans, and mutual funds in Russia, and urge other major multinational companies to follow suit through collective corporate social responsibility.
Cut ties with all state-run Russian entities, specifically in the energy sector, beyond restrictions currently imposed by U.S., EU, and other sanctions and monitor ongoing sanctions to ensure compliance.
Institute stringent impediments to the Russian government and elites accessing funds and safe havens abroad.
Ensure enforcement of sanctions compliance in the cryptocurrency space to prevent Russia from using cryptocurrencies outside of the traditional banking system to avoid the impact of sanctions.
Heed U.S. intelligence warnings and strengthen cyber defenses, in response to threats of retaliatory Russian cyber-attacks in Europe and America.
Move beyond ending business operations in Russia and become actively involved in Ukrainian reconstruction through remote hiring of Ukraine-based technology employees and refugees and helping to rebuild the country’s decimated infrastructure.
Invest in Ukraine and the region, including states where both Ukrainian and Russian refugees are flocking, to support economic stability and development, advance peacebuilding, and address potential drivers of instability, fragility, or wider conflict.
Provide sustained cash and in-kind support to address the impacts of the war in Ukraine, including in areas of refugee resettlement, humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding assistance, and invest in long-term recovery efforts.
Climate and Environmental Impact of the Crisis
The conflict has created widespread suffering, destruction, and death—however, the environmental impact of the conflict is just now starting to be understood, and it will take years to fully process the true environmental cost. As of January 2024, the conflict has caused $56.4 billion in damage to the environment, as well as contaminated 30% of Ukraine’s territory with landmines and unexploded ordnance. Ukraine is now the most mined country in the world—impacting 174,000 square kilometers—contributing to one of the largest demining challenges since World War II. Demining of the country may take decades and perhaps centuries.
As of February 2024, the Ukrainian agricultural sector has experienced more than $80 billion in direct losses and damages as a result of the war. The first 12 months of the conflict triggered an estimated net increase of 120 million tons of greenhouse gasses, which is likely to increase throughout the war and post-conflict reconstruction. Ukraine is also facing widespread deforestation, damage to renewable energy systems, chemical spillage in rivers and groundwater, and severe harm to farmlands.
The June 2023 collapse of the Kakhovka Dam, located in Russian-occupied territory, created immediate and long-term climate impacts. The dam caused extensive flooding in the region, and not only killed hundreds of people and destroyed thousands of homes, but also damaged farmland, decreased the water supply, endangered over 160,000 animals and 20,000 birds (some only found in the region), and washed over 150 tons of machine oil into the Dnieper River. The Kakhovka Dam collapse exacerbated the already severe humanitarian crisis—affecting over 20,000 people and forcing thousands more to flee to avoid flooding. Additionally, the dam destruction has negatively impacted access to clean drinking water for 700,000 individuals.
To monitor and combat the environmental crisis created by the conflict, the UN Development Program and the Government of Sweden operationalized a Coordinated Center for Environmental Damage Assessment. The Center will monitor, record the impact, and explore remedies to the environmental damage created by the war, with an initial investment of $6.7 million for 2023-2025.
Despite the short- and long-term challenges, reconstruction presents an opportunity to promote “green” efforts to help Ukraine transform into a net-zero economy.
Immediate actions needed:
Other UN member states should invest in the Coordinated Center for Environmental Damage Assessment to help monitor the climate impacts and implement green and sustainable reconstruction and recovery efforts in Ukraine, especially in a conflict-sensitive manner.
Donors must ensure that a portion of their aid packages strengthens Ukraine’s emergency response capacity to support repairs to critical infrastructure, including renewable energy systems, and land remediation measures. Donors should support and fund The Halo Network and other civil society efforts to de-mine land throughout Ukraine.
Governments, donors, and multilateral institutions must integrate climate and conflict considerations in disaster response and reconstruction efforts to ensure all climate/environmental programs are conflict-sensitive and all conflict-prevention and peacebuilding efforts are climate-sensitive. Furthermore, civil society and aid organizations must mitigate environmental impacts and practices that exacerbate climate change.
Continue to fund, support, and create programs like Seeds for Ukraine aimed at helping families whose land and livelihoods are impacted by the conflict.
Support the Russian People and Regional Populations Impacted by the Conflict
As the world mobilizes in response to aggression by the Russian government, the international community must take care to not unjustly target the innocent Russian people, who are far removed from the decision-making processes in the Kremlin and battlefield. Russian President Vladimir Putin is dramatically seeking to increase conscription implicating millions of Russian men, including through a “partial mobilization” in September 2022 and a law passed in April 2023 that streamlines future conscription and bans draftees from leaving the country. In September 2023, Putin called up 130,000 conscripts for military service, as well as raised the age limit of conscripts from 27 to 30. Human rights organizations have also reported that Russia is forcing Ukrainian citizens in occupied regions to serve in the Russian military. Russia has not closed any border crossings following the attempts of many eligible reservists and potential conscripts to flee, but is imposing new measures to identify those seeking to avoid service, including facial recognition technology.
In October 2022, in response to mass arrests and imprisonment of human rights defenders and journalists, the UN”s Human Rights Council appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Russian Federation—the first such to be established in relation to a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In May 2023, Mariana Katzarova began her work as the Special Rapporteur. In September 2023, the Special Rapporteur submitted her report on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation. The report observed a widespread pattern of civic and political suppression, including the detainment of more than 20,000 Russians between February 2022 and June 2023 for participating in “largely peaceful” anti-war protests, as well as 600 lawsuits by the Russian government against alleged “anti-war activity.” In October 2023, the UN extended the mandate for another year.
In March 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted the continued closing of civic space in Russia, troubling legislation affecting the LGBTQ+ community, and the alarming law whereby any person or entity who engages in civic activism can be designated a "foreign agent” and subjected to heavy fines and restricted access to public life. The Kremlin continues to crack down on opposition with new arrests and sentencing of opposition leaders, forced disappearances, and the elimination of independent media.
Russian stability took a surprising turn in June 2023 when the Wagner Group appeared to initiate a rebellion against Putin and his government. Although the Wagner Group turned its march to Moscow around, the events highlighted tensions between Russia and the forces widely responsible for Russia's biggest victories in Ukraine and some of the most egregious atrocities. Additionally, the February 2024 death of the imprisoned Russian dissident Alexei Navalny underscores the dangers facing Russians who speak out against the government’s authoritarian practices.
The Russian people are not the enemy. The conflict presents an opportunity to support Russian actors and organizations working toward democracy, human rights, and nonviolence.
Immediate actions needed:
Governments and civil society must provide clear messaging that the Russian people are not the enemy and donors must fund and support Russian civil society, human rights and anti-war activists, and political dissidents in and outside of Russia in a manner that protects them from “foreign agent” designation and other penalties imposed by the government.
Donors and the private sector should support creative and innovative ways to ensure unsanitized information about the conflict in Ukraine reaches the Russian population, such as the Torrents of Truth Initiative that allows Russian journalists to disseminate reporting on the conflict in Ukraine disguised as pirated movies, TV shows, and other entertainment content. Other initiatives include options to make phone calls or to send emails directly to Russian citizens.
The international community—especially the European Union—should provide coordinated support for human rights defenders and others opposed to the conflict through resettlement and livelihood support, as well as for the communities in which they settle, particularly in countries that have been subject to past Russian aggression, such as Georgia. Donors should support efforts toward dialogue, peacebuilding, and social cohesion to address tensions resulting from the inflows of Russian refugees and historical resentment, injustice, and violence.
UN Member States should elevate, promote, and support through all available means the work of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Russian Federation, including by assisting with investigations and consultations.
Donors should also support countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus—such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Georgia—now home to large populations of Russian refugees, as well as a return of migrant workers, which could lead to increased tensions, violence (including gender-based violence), and political instability. Although official numbers do not exist, research published in October 2023 estimated that more than 820,000 people have left Russia since the start of the war. The response from countries receiving these individuals has been mixed, ranging from welcoming to hostile.
Governments and multilateral institutions must seek to minimize the impacts of economic sanctions on innocent Russian civilians. In particular, they must work to ensure that sanctions do not adversely affect Russian civil society and activities working to end the conflict and promote democracy within Russia. The international community should amplify the voices of Russians who speak out against Russian aggression, especially Russian artists, athletes, and other prominent leaders.
Donors must also address the regional consequences of sanctions, particularly in countries that are ruble-dependent or inextricably tied to the Russian market, and prepare for potential Russian interference, destabilization, and closing civic space in its sphere of influence. Donors should further support democracy and human rights in these areas to reverse Russia’s influence.
Donors should also urgently scale up support, subsidies, investment in climate-resilient technologies, and other measures to protect countries that rely heavily on Russian and Ukrainian imports to avoid and mitigate food and economic crises in places such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa region, and Asia.
Address the Long-Term Impacts of the Conflict in Ukraine
The current conflict in Ukraine requires serious, acute attention, but the international community must also develop a strategy to address the long-term impacts of the conflict. The World Bank estimates the cost of reconstruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy to be around $500 billion over the next decade. Beyond the immediate need to rebuild roads, schools, hospitals, homes, factories, and businesses, donors must consider ways to support the democratically-elected government and Ukraine’s robust civil society in the days, months, and years ahead. The international community must consider flexible programming that anticipates evolving needs and allows for adaptation, as well as support Ukrainian refugees unable or unwilling to return home. Through contingency planning now and the development of a long-term strategy, the U.S. and international community can articulate a “clear, positive” vision focused on a prosperous Ukraine, rather than a more negative vision of countering Russia.
Immediate actions needed:
The international community, legal institutions, and Ukrainians must thoroughly investigate, document, coordinate, and adjudicate all alleged violations of international law perpetrated throughout the conflict and bring those responsible to justice.
To the extent stabilization is possible, donors must provide sustained development, economic, and other assistance to rebuild critical infrastructure, institutions, and capacity and address the healthcare needs, particularly mental health, through psychosocial, gender-sensitive, and trauma-informed support. Donors should look to and amplify the work of organizations like Disaster Ready and The KonTerra Group, which published a series of free videos on mental health topics regarding the conflict in Ukraine, as well as online courses on key humanitarian topics.
Donors must also fund robust programming for peacebuilding, democracy and governance, cybersecurity, and combatting mis/disinformation to ensure social cohesion, build resilience, and prevent future destabilizing actions by Russia. Funding should include specific support for local organizations and salaries.
Critically, donors should also support anti-corruption efforts to safeguard the large influx of foreign assistance flowing to Ukraine and address potential post-conflict social, economic, and political challenges.
If Ukraine remains occupied and stabilization programming is not possible, then donors must provide contingency “humanitarian plus” programming that continues the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as supports the democratically-elected government and Ukrainian civil society and promotes activism, non-violent resistance, social movements, and unarmed civilian protection.
Donors must recognize the gendered impacts of the conflict and support and advocate for the inclusion of women in decision-making and all peace and security efforts to address the conflict and its aftermath in line with the WPS Agenda.
Donors must support a survivor-centered approach to help victims of conflict-related sexual violence receive access to necessary aid, including medical care, psychological support, and legal assistance. Without access to these essential services, many women survivors may face long-term health consequences that compound existing gender inequalities. Donors must also create programs and support for children born of conflict-related sexual violence.
Donors must provide the same level of support and empowerment tools to men and boys who are also survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. The impact of sexual violence against men and boys has not been given the same attention as against women and girls, and donors must provide adequate resources to address all forms of sexual violence in a conflict zone. The international community must deploy a comprehensive, gender-sensitive, trauma-informed, and victim-centered approach to assist those who have experienced violence, human trafficking, and abuse in the conflict to address their long-term psychosocial and physical needs.
Donors, civil society organizations, and justice institutions participating in accountability processes must ensure that all witnesses receive gender-sensitive and trauma-informed support and protection during interviews, testimony, and other processes to secure their safety and avoid re-traumatization.
Donors and the private sector must continue to invest in host countries of Ukrainian and Russian refugees to promote social cohesion and peacebuilding focused on relationship-building, community relationship management, and the equitable availability of social services for populations facing protection needs.
Donors, governments, multilateral institutions, and civil society must work to prevent the long-term availability of weapons in Ukraine amid the proliferation of weapons to all parties of the conflict. They must plan for and support long-term disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming upon the cessation of hostilities. Significant resources in funding and technical capacity must be provided to undertake extensive demining efforts.
Donors must ensure that all future assistance is flexible and adaptive and programming is locally-led and owned.
Ukrainian refugees will continue to require sustained socio-economic support, including classes in local languages, job assistance, and childcare services. The U.S. and other host countries must enhance resettlement support and reduce the burdens towards legal pathways of entry and status for those fleeing the conflict.
The “Laptops for Ukraine“ Initiative launched by the EU in December 2022 must continue to receive support as it helps Ukrainians stay connected to the world and is now supporting museums to digitally safeguard Ukrainian culture and documents.
Moving Ahead: Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Globally
In 2018, the world was experiencing a 30-year high in violent conflict. Unfortunately, subsequent significant crises are compounding and increasing fragility, conflict, and atrocities, including large-scale wars in Ukraine, Sudan, and Israel-Gaza, climate change, food insecurity, and the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, more than 130.8 million stateless and forcibly displaced people are expected to need UN support in 2024 and an estimated 300 million people will need humanitarian assistance and protection globally. As of early 2024, 30 countries are at risk of new mass killings, democracies are backsliding globally, and unchecked proliferation of powerful emerging technologies like AI is radically reshaping the world’s economies and societies.
The Ukraine crisis once again demonstrates the need for a fundamental shift in international development, peace and security, and diplomacy efforts to focus on conflict and atrocities prevention and peacebuilding instead of crisis response. As recognized by the Global Fragility Act (GFA), WPS Act and Agenda, the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, and the World Bank Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, peacebuilding activities are vital to addressing conflict drivers to prevent and end violence. The game-changing prevention approaches outlined in these laws and policies have the potential to center conflict prevention and peacebuilding in international development and diplomacy. In doing so, the need for costlier security interventions and emergency humanitarian responses will be dramatically reduced. However, these laws and policies must be fully funded to be successful.
Unfortunately, there have been significant delays and under-resourcing in implementing the GFA, the WPS Act, and other prevention-oriented initiatives. As per the law, a global fragility strategy and the selection of five priority countries and regions were due to Congress in September 2020. The U.S. Government released a global strategy in December 2020. The list of priority countries and region were only released on April 1, 2022, and the 10-year implementation plans were transmitted to Congress on March 24, 2023. While there will always be competing crises at home and abroad, the GFA is the best tool to reduce violent conflict globally and prevent it from breaking out in the first place. We urge the Biden Administration to work closely with international and local civil society and stakeholders to ensure the successful implementation of the GFA, integrate conflict prevention within all U.S. foreign assistance, and scale the approaches embodied within the GFA globally. New humanitarian and security crises will always serve as a reminder of the necessity of conflict and atrocity prevention, which by their very nature avoid costly interventions after a full-brown crisis has begun.
As we work to make this much-needed shift to prevention, we must also acknowledge the disparity of the global response to Ukraine versus other conflicts. While the crisis in Ukraine involves nuclear threats and profound implications for economic and geopolitical stability, the international community must reflect on how it addressed and continues to respond to other conflicts including Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Yemen. In the future, donors, governments, multilateral institutions, the private sector, and civil society collectively must mobilize with equal empathy and resolve to promote peace, protect civilians, seek accountability for violations of human rights and international law, and provide adequate relief to all those in need regardless of identity or where they live.
Finally, as the world watches Ukrainians defend their country, Americans must commit to defending and renewing their democracy, preventing violent conflict, and building peace at home and abroad. President Biden rightfully observed that "more than half of all democracies have experienced a decline in at least one aspect of their democracy over the last 10 years, including the United States.“ We urgently call on the U.S. Government to propose new and robust resources for programs in the U.S. that address conflict dynamics, including preventing and reducing violent extremism and building social cohesion.